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of divorce on the income and consumption of children born to two-parent households, and the effects of
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estimates are substantially less than the difference in income implied by cross-sectional comparisons of
different family types.  When income changes are measured according to time since the parents first
divorce, there is substantial recovery in income, virtually all of which is explained by subsequent
remarriages.  Similarly, when we look at income several years after a parent’s first marriage, the gain is
28 to 33%, reflecting the short-lived nature of many of these marriages.
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  Over the past fifty years the number of single-parent families in the United States 
has skyrocketed.  Between 1960 and 1995, the number of children living apart from one 
of their parents increased from 12% to almost 40% (McLanahan, 1997), the rate of 
divorce increased by over 200% (Friedberg, 1998) and the fraction of children born out-
of-wedlock rose from about 5% to over 30% (Cancian and Reed, 2000).  Half of all 
American children today are expected to spend part of their childhood in a family headed 
by a mother who is divorced, separated, unwed or widowed (Bumpass and Raley, 1995).   
What does this change in family structure mean for American children?    In 
particular, to what extent are the economic resources available to children living in 
single-parent families compromised by the absence of a second cohabitating adult?  
Social scientists often assess the “effect” of family structure on economic well-being by 
comparing the average income among two-parent families to the average income of 
single-parent families (McLanahan and Casper, 1995; Spain and Bianchi, 1996; Waite, 
1995).  These studies unequivocally show that family structure is substantially related to 
economic well-being, and are often cited by those who advocate for societal and legal 
changes that would strengthen marriage (e.g. Whitehead, 1996).  In spite of their wide 
use, however, these types of statistics are unable to tell us how much of the observed gap 
is actually caused by the absence of a second parent.  Cross-sectional comparisons across 
family types do not necessarily indicate how single-parent families would fare were they 
to become two-parent families because other factors may be partly responsible for the 
variation in resource levels.     2 
 
 
  The causal effect of family structure on a family’s economic resources has 
important implications for public policy.  In recent years, the belief that marriage bestows 
large economic gains has generated enthusiasm for policy proposals that encourage the 
formation and continuation of two-parent families (Gallager, 1996; Galston, 1996; Ooms, 
1996; Popenoe, 1996; Waite, 1995; Whitehead, 1996).  This enthusiasm has lead to 
several policy changes: the states of Arizona, Arkansas and Louisiana, for example, have 
created “covenant marriages,” in which couples agree at the time they are married to 
conditions that make it harder for them to divorce.
1  In addition, about three quarters of 
states have broadened the eligibility criteria for the Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF) program to include two-parent families.  TANF’s former incarnation as 
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC)), was targeted towards 
single-parent families on the grounds that children in such families suffer economic 
losses as a direct result of their parents’ marital status.  If the losses to children growing 
up in single-parent families are small, then the grounds for this type of targeting may be 
tenuous.  If these losses are large, however, then targeted cash assistance may be an 
appropriate means of mitigating them. 
  This study has three goals.  Our first goal is to estimate how much the economic 
status of single-parent children could be improved if they lived with both of their parents.  
We accomplish this task by estimating a dynamic model with longitudinal data that 
allows us to incorporate family-specific fixed effects.  We look separately at the impact 
of divorce and out-of-wedlock childbearing.  Although other studies have estimated 
changes in family income following divorce, they have focused on comparisons of pre-
                                                           
1 Legislation for covenant marriages has also passed one house in Georgia, Oklahoma, 
Oregon and Texas.   3 
 
 
divorce to post-divorce resources, which do not take life-cycle earnings growth into 
account, and are thus likely to underestimate the true loss.  To our knowledge, there have 
been no studies that have used a fixed effects model to estimate the resource costs 
associated with being born to a single parent.   
Our dynamic model also allows us to trace out the losses associated with single-
parent status over an extended time interval.  Children whose parents divorce, for 
example, may experience a short-term income reduction that is recouped in later years 
when their mothers remarry or become more active labor force participants.  Quantifying 
the time-path of economic losses following a divorce or out-of-wedlock birth is 
particularly important in the wake of TANF, which places a five year life-time limit on 
receipt of benefits, and requires that participants become members of the labor force 
within two years of initiating benefits.  If the costs of growing up in a single-parent 
family persist for many years, then these time limits may have serious implications for 
children’s well-being.   
  Finally, we use our model to examine how family structure affects the 
components of income over time.  We look separately at changes in fathers’ earned 
income, mother’s earned income, child support and alimony payments, and welfare 
income.  This exercise allows us to see how families modify their behavior in response to 
a change in marital status.   
  We find that controlling for unobservable family background characteristics is 
important.  Simple cross-sectional family income comparisons between children born 
out-of-wedlock and children born into two-parent families, for example, are almost 1.8 
times bigger than our estimated cost of being born to a single mother.  OLS regressions   4 
 
 
produce coefficient estimates of the effects of marriage that are more than twice as large 
as our fixed-effects estimates.  Nevertheless, even after controlling for unobservables, we 
estimate large family structure effects.  Our dynamic analysis also shows that the gains 
associated with marriage fall somewhat over time for children born out-of-wedlock and 
that the initial losses experienced by children whose parents divorce are partially 
recovered in later years.  Most of this recovery is explained by the fact that a substantial 
fraction of divorced mothers remarry.   Finally, our dynamic income decompositions 
suggest that families’ respond to the absence of a second parent in a variety of ways that 
help mitigate some of the costs. 
 
2. Estimating the Cost of Growing Up in a Single Parent Family 
2.1 Background 
  It is well known that children growing up in single-parent families have fewer 
economic resources than children living in two-parent families.  In 1999, for example, 
median family income for a two-parent family with children was $60,296, whereas 
median family income for a female-headed family with children was $22,418 (Census 
Bureau, March 2000 CPS). McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) estimate similar differences 
in assets across family types: using the PSID, they find that while 98 % of two-parent 
families with an adolescent child own their own car, only 70% of similarly defined 
single-parent families own a car.  Likewise, only 50% of such families own their home, 
whereas 87% of two-parent families (with an adolescent) are home-owners.  Many 
believe that these differences in resources can explain a significant part of the well 
documented differences in socioeconomic outcomes between adults who grew up in two   5 
 
 
parent families and adults who grew up in single parent families.  McLanahan and 
Sandefur, (1994), for example, attribute half of the difference in outcomes to differences 
in family income.
2   
Cross-sectional comparisons of income across different family types can be 
misleading, however.  Table 1 shows that even prior to marital dissolution average family 
income and consumption are lower for families that will eventually go through divorce 
than for families that will remain intact.  This suggests that part of the income difference 
across family types may exist for reasons other than differences in family structure.  
Previous researchers have noted this problem, but have struggled to address it
3, 
particularly when assessing the economic consequences for children born out-of-
wedlock—the only estimates we have been able to find for these children are simple 
cross-sectional comparisons like those discussed above.  Researchers have typically 
estimated the costs of divorce by comparing changes in economic resources across two 
time periods, before and after a divorce occurs (for a review, see Holden and Smock, 
1991; also McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994), but while cross-sectional comparisons are 
likely to overstate the effect of family structure on economic resources, estimates based 
on simple “before and after” comparisons are likely to be downward biased since they do 
not control for life-cycle earnings growth.  Most of these studies do not include a control 
                                                           
2 It is important to note that there is debate about the extent to which income affects 
children’s outcomes.  Mayer (1997), for example, uses different methods and finds little 
evidence that income plays a role in children’s outcomes. 
3 Smock, Manning and Gupta (1999) attempt to deal with the selection problem by 
estimating endogenous switching regression models.  Their exclusion restrictions include 
whether the respondent (wife) worked full-time prior to the divorce, whether she lived 
with both her biological parents before age 14, her mother’s educational attainment, age 
at the time of the marriage, duration of marriage and whether the marriage was a first 
marriage for both spouses.  The authors argue that these variables predict the likelihood   6 
 
 
group. Another drawback is that when the comparisons are restricted to only two points 
in time they overlook the possibility of dynamic adjustments to changes in marital status.  
The few studies that examine the time-path of economic resources following divorce 
(Bane and Weiss, 1980; Butrica, 1998; Duncan and Hoffman, 1985a, 1985b; Peterson, 
1989; Stirling, 1989, Weiss, 1984) are typically based on non-representative, dated 
samples.
4  More important, none of them employ regression analysis, so they are unable 
to control for what income growth would have been in the absence of the divorce or to 
control for other factors that may be changing over time.   
Duncan and Hoffman (1985a, 1985b) (with a follow-up by Butrica, 1998) provide 
the most comprehensive dynamic study to date.  Using the PSID, they trace out family 
income for a sample of children between the ages of one and five in the year prior to their 
parents’ divorce, from the year before the divorce until five years after the divorce.  Their 
study is based on divorces or separations that occurred between 1969 and 1975.  The 
divorced sample’s income in the years around the marital dissolution is compared to 
income for a sample of children in continuously married families between 1971 and 
1977.  Duncan and Hoffman find that the average income of children whose parents’ 
divorce or separate falls by about 30% in the year after the divorce, but that within five 
years of the marital dissolution, their average income is close to its pre-divorce level.  
Most of this recovery can be explained by high rates of remarriage: for children whose 
mothers’ remain unmarried throughout the observation period, income levels remain 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of marital disruption.  These variables are also likely to be correlated with income, 
however. 
4 Bane and Weiss (1980) and Weiss (1984), for example, restrict their analysis to a 
sample of women who remain unmarried.  Peterson (1989) focuses on women aged 30-44 
in 1967.  Stirling (1989) looks only at women who have been divorced for at least five 
years.   7 
 
 
about 30% below their initial levels.   Furthermore, although children whose mothers’ 
remarry regain their previous levels of income, they never catch up to their peers whose 
parents remain married because incomes in continuously married families grow 
throughout the period. 
  Our study is similar in spirit to that of Duncan and Hoffman, but it goes beyond 
their work by employing a more comprehensive statistical methodology.  Our empirical 
framework allows us to control for income growth over the life-cycle, which enables us 
to estimate the effect of divorce on economic resources relative to what they would have 
been if the divorce had not taken place.  We are also able to allow for differences in 
income growth across family types, and to control for macroeconomic factors whose 
omission may bias previous estimates.  Our study extends Duncan and Hoffman’s sample 
by 12 years, and includes children between birth and age 16 instead of between the ages 
of 1 and 5.  Focusing on young children (and, therefore, young parents) could lead to 
biased estimates of the average divorce effect since earnings growth is steeper among 
young workers and since mothers’ labor supply is lowest when their children are young.
5 
  To our knowledge, there have been no attempts to take unobservables into 
account when estimating the economic losses experienced by children who are born out-
of-wedlock.  Cross-period comparisons have not been applied to this group, presumably 
because it is difficult to come up with an appropriate “initial” period.  Our model can be 
extended to provide such estimates, however.  Using a sample of children born into 
single-parent families, we estimate the economic gains experienced by some of the 
children when their mothers marry and interpret the negative of these estimates as upper   8 
 
 
bounds on the loss associated with single-parent status.  If women who marry have larger 
potential gains to marriage than those who do not marry, then our estimates will overstate 
the gains to marriage for the typical out-of-wedlock child, but they will still be lower than 
the cross-sectional statistics that are currently cited because they will be based on a model 
that controls for fixed effects. 
 
2.2 Econometric Model 
  Our basic approach is to use a fixed-effects estimator to control for unobserved 
family characteristics that may be correlated with divorce and marriage probabilities, 
using data for children whose parents’ marital status changed at some point during our 
observation window and a comparison group of children whose parents’ marital status 
did not change during the period.  Specifically, given longitudinal data on family 
resources and marital histories, the effects of divorce on the economic resources available 
to children can be modeled in the following way: 
it t i it it it u D X I + + + + = γ α δ β l n        ( 1 )  
where Iit is a measure of the economic resources available to child i in year t, Xit is a 
vector of child/family specific variables that vary over time and that may be correlated 
with the child’s economic status, and Dit is a vector of dummy variables indicating that a 
divorce has taken place in a future, current, or previous year.  The error term has three 
components, a child-specific fixed effect,  i α , a year-specific effect,  t γ , and a random 
component,  it u . 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 Since mothers’ labor supply has been increasing over time, the divorce effect may be 
smaller in more recent years.  Our ability to include 12 additional years of data, may 
therefore affect the average estimates as well.   9 
 
 
The vector of divorce indicators (Dit) contains three types of variables: dummy 
variables that equal one in the years prior to the divorce, a dummy variable equal to one 
in the year that the divorce takes place, and a series of dummy variables indicating that a 
divorce took place in a previous year.  The first set of indicator variables captures the 
possibility that family resources may begin to deteriorate prior to the actual divorce.  This 
might happen if, for example, a divorce is precipitated by a parent’s job loss: failure to 
include “years prior” dummies would lead to a biased estimate of the effect of the 
divorce.  Our model, therefore, includes a dummy variable for each of the two years 
preceding the divorce.  The dummy variable indicating the year of the divorce captures 
the immediate effect of the divorce on family income and consumption, whereas the 
coefficients on the set of variables indicating that a divorce has taken place in a previous 
year will reflect the persistence of the divorce effect over time.  Two methods will be 
used to define these post-divorce indicators.  Initially, these variables will refer to the 
years that have elapsed since the child first experienced his parents’ divorce.  Later, we 
will define the variables with respect to years since the most recent divorce.  We follow 
the post-divorce period for six years, including a dummy variable indicating that six or 
more years have elapsed since the divorce took place. 
  The error term in the above equation contains a time-invariant child-specific 
effect,  i α , which captures anything about the child’s family that is constant over time.  
Since most children in single parent families live with their mothers, this variable will 
primarily pick up characteristics of the child’s mother that may be correlated with both 
divorce probabilities and the family’s resources. If mothers with lower earnings capacity 
are more susceptible to divorce, then estimates of divorce effects that fail to control for   10 
 
 
i α  will be biased towards finding larger losses.  As discussed above, other studies have 
estimated the resource losses associated with divorce by comparing family resources in a 
particular period before the divorce to family resources in a particular period after the 
divorce, but unless the change in resources is compared to an appropriate control group 
the estimates produced using this method will not tell us how much better off children 
would be if their parents had remained together.  Furthermore, the approach may 
overstate or understate the average annual losses associated with the event, depending on 
which “before” and “after” years are chosen.  The advantage of the model we employ is 
that it traces out the economic consequences in each year following the divorce and 
allows us to estimate both the short-term and long-term effects, which may differ. 
  Because this model includes fixed effects, the variables in X that do not vary over 
time, such as race and mother’s education, are eliminated from the model.  The only 
variables included in X are the child’s age, his age squared and family size.
6   Equation 
(1) also includes a vector of calendar-year dummy variables ( t γ ).  These variables will 
control for economy-wide income and consumption changes over time, including both 
business cycle effects and trends in income and consumption over the period we study. 
  Unbiased estimates of the economic consequences of being born into a single-
parent family are even more elusive than unbiased estimates of divorce effects because 
unlike the case of divorce there is no obvious “before” period to compare the single-
parent family’s resources.  As a result, existing information is limited to simple cross-
sectional comparisons.  We propose an alternative way of estimating these losses that 
                                                           
6 In the consumption regressions we also control for the family’s “food needs,” which is a 
variable created by the PSID to measure the caloric needs of the family, accounting for 
family size, sex, and the age of the family members.   11 
 
 
allows us to incorporate family fixed effects.  Specifically, using a longitudinal sample of 
children born out-of-wedlock we can estimate the parameters of the following model 
it t i it it it u M X I + + + + = γ α δ β l n        ( 2 )  
Where Mit  is a vector of dummy variables indicating that a marriage has taken place in a 
future, current, or previous year.  The negative of these parameters can be interpreted as 
the loss associated with remaining in a single-parent family that was formed by an out-of-
wedlock birth.  This model is essentially the inverse of equation (1) in that it compares 
changes over time in the resources available to children whose parents’ married at some 
point during our observation window to changes over time in the resources of children 
whose parents remained single.  The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to 
control for unobservable child/family specific factors that may be correlated with both 
marital decisions and economic status. 
  Our estimates of δ provide information on the effects of changes in family 
structure on the children who experience them.   In the language of Heckman, LaLonde, 
and Smith (1999) we estimate the effect of “treatment on the treated.”  If the impact of 
divorce or marriage would be different for children whose family structure remains 
constant over time then δ ˆ will be a biased estimate of the average effect that divorce or 
marriage would have on the population.  For example, if the gains to marriage are larger 
for women who choose to marry than for women who choose not to marry then our 
estimates of δ  will be upward biased estimates of the costs to children of growing up in a 
single-parent family formed by an out-of-wedlock birth.  We show, however, that even 
with this upward bias our estimates are substantially smaller than estimates that do not 
control for fixed effects.  Furthermore, they do directly apply to the majority of children   12 
 
 
born to single mothers, since 52% of children born to single parents have spent some time 
in a two-parent household by the time they reach age 15.  Forty percent of these children 
experience at least one year in a two-parent household by the age of six. 
  In the case of divorce, similar issues arise; we estimate the effects of divorce 
among those children whose parents do actually divorce.  In this case, however, it is less 
clear how estimates of divorce effects for the untreated group would be of interest to 
policymakers.  We care about how much better off the “treated” children would be if 
their parents had not divorced.  Estimates of the population-wide effect of divorce would 
not answer this question. 
 
3. Data 
  Our data come from the 1968 through 1993 waves of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, a longitudinal survey conducted by the University of Michigan’s Institute for 
Social Research.  The PSID began by interviewing a national probability sample of 
families in 1968 and has reinterviewed the members of those families every year since.  
The PSID also follows a subsample of families in poverty.  We make use of both samples 
in order to increase the precision of the estimates.  Our regressions are weighted using the 
individual weights for the last year in which the individual is observed. 
  Since our primary interest is in how family structure affects the economic 
resources available to children, our sample consists of children who are potentially 
followed from the year of birth until age 16.  Our analysis is based on two samples: the 
first sample consists of children born into two-parent families, and the second sample 
consists of children born into single-parent families.  We use the first sample to estimate   13 
 
 
the effects of divorce, and the second sample to estimate the losses associated with being 
born out-of-wedlock.  Children who were born prior to the 1968 survey are excluded 
from the sample because we cannot determine whether they were born into a two-parent 
or single-parent family.  After individuals turn 16 they are no longer followed, because 
we want to be sure that any observed changes in family structure are associated with their 
family of origin.  Some PSID children are not present throughout the entire length of the 
survey.  We include these individuals from birth until the first year they are missing data, 
but do not include them in any subsequent years even if they have valid data, because the 
missing years make it impossible to determine parents’ marital status in that year, and, 
therefore, to accurately ascertain the number of years since a change in family structure 
took place. 
  We use three different measures of the economic resources available to the 
family:  the log of pre-tax family income, the log of post-tax family income, and the log 
of family consumption.  Each of these measures has its pros and cons as a measure of 
economic well-being.  A number of researchers have argued that consumption measures 
are preferable to income measures because income systematically understates the 
financial resources available to a household, and because consumption is a more direct 
measure of well-being (Meyer and Sullivan, 2001).  Unfortunately, consumption 
information in the PSID is limited to food consumption, and although food consumption 
is the sort of necessary expenditure that is of interest to policymakers, one might expect 
to see less variation in food expenditures than in almost any other consumption item: 
families may spend down their savings in order to maintain some threshold level of food 
consumption.  We remain agnostic about which measure is best, and present the results   14 
 
 
for both income and consumption.
7  Most of the literature focuses on pre-tax income, but 
we present results for post-tax income as well since changes in the number of adult 
earners in the family may change the family’s tax bracket.  In order to account for 
changes in family composition that accompany resource changes, all of our regressions 
control for family size.  We have also used income-to-needs as a dependent variable, and 
the estimates generated from those regressions are very similar to our income results.
8 
Economic resources are measured at the level of the PSID family unit.  This 
means that if children are living with both their mother and their grandparents, and the 
mother and grandparents are pooling resources and expenses, then the grandparent’s 
resource contributions are included as part of what is available to the child.    This seems 
like the appropriate way of measuring children’s economic well-being since single 
parents’ living arrangements may be chosen as a way of maximizing their resources.
9 
10 
The timing of the PSID questions varies across the different variables.  Questions 
about family income clearly refer to the previous calendar year, whereas information 
about family structure is recorded at the point of the interview.  Since a change in family 
structure recorded at the time of the interview may have occurred at any time in the 
                                                           
7 Food consumption data are missing for 1973, 1988 and 1989.  The PSID also includes 
information about expenditures on rent and mortgage payments, and utilities, but these 
data are missing additional years and so we do not use them.  It would be difficult to 
compute housing consumption flows from owner occupied housing since some 
households have no mortgage payments. 
8 The results from this exercise are available from the authors. 
9 An exception to this is that individuals who return to an extended family home after 
being out on their own continue to be interviewed by the PSID as a separate family  unit.  
For example, an adult daughter of a PSID family who returns to her parents home after 
having a child will continue to be counted as a head of her own household.  
10 Focusing on aggregate measures of resources overlooks the important question of how 
resources are allocated within families.  It may be that economic shocks cause parents to 
disproportionately reduce their own consumption in order to maintain their children’s   15 
 
 
previous year, we ignore the different frames of reference and match the family structure 
and income data from the same survey year.
11  The timing of the food consumption 
questions is ambiguous, but Zeldes (1989) argues that it refers to the point of the 
interview rather than the previous year.
12  Again, we match the family structure 
information and the consumption information from the same survey year.  We eliminate 
observations for which income or consumption data are imputed. 
A limitation of the PSID is that it is difficult to identify relationships among 
sample members who are not household heads.  This is probably not a serious problem 
for the sample of children who begin life in two-parent families since the parents of most 
of these children are household heads or wives whose marital status is well documented, 
but it is potentially problematic for our sample of children born out-of-wedlock because a 
larger fraction of these children are living in families in which the household head is not 
the parent.  We therefore use the PSID Relationship and Marital History files to carefully 
document transitions between marital (or cohabitating) states.  We define a family as a 
two-parent family if the child’s custodial parent is married or living as a couple with 
another adult.  Our definition of divorce includes married couples who are living in 
separate residences and unmarried couples who had been living together but are 
separated.  Similarly, when we refer to “marriage” among parents of children born out-
of-wedlock we include both legal marriage and cohabitation.  These broad definitions of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
consumption at its previous level.  We know of no longitudinal data set that would allow 
us to investigate this issue, however. 
11 We have also conducted the analysis linking the current survey year’s family structure 
information to the following survey year’s income information and obtain very similar 
results. 
12 An exception is food expenditures paid for using food stamps.  Before 1977, this is 
measured using average monthly food stamp expenditures last year, but after 1977 the 
question refers to food stamp expenditures in the month of the survey.   16 
 
 
two-parent families are intended to focus our analysis on the economic consequences 
associated with the presence of a second adult in the household, regardless of legal 
marital status.  
After deleting observations for which the income and consumption measures are 
imputed or missing, the sample of children beginning life in a two-parent family contains 
53,188 child-year observations, and 7,397 children, 1,352 of whom experience a parental 
divorce.  The income sample of children born out-of-wedlock contains 12,628 child-year 
observations and 2,042 children, 465 of whose custodial parents marry sometime before 
they turn 16.  These samples are slightly smaller when consumption is our dependent 




4.A. The Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution 
  In Table 1 we document why cross-sectional comparisons of children’s resources 
might be problematic.  The table provides the means of our variables in the year of the 
child’s birth, which is before the change in family structure occurs.  On the left side of 
the table we see that those households that will eventually experience a divorce have 
lower income and food consumption than those households in which the parents remain 
together.  Parents who ultimately divorce also have less education on average, than 
parents who remain together, and are more likely to be black.  These observable 
differences across families provide a hint that unobservable differences may also be 
correlated with both family structure and economic resources.  When we use our data to 
run ordinary least squares regressions of family resources on marital status (controlling   17 
 
 
for the child’s age, age-squared, race, mother’s education and year dummies) we find that 
children living in divorced families have pre-tax income that is 55% below that of 
children in intact families, post-tax income that is 52% lower, and food consumption that 
is 27% below that of their counterparts.  Table 2 shows what happens to the estimated 
resource loss when we take unobservable differences into account.  The estimates in the 
left-hand columns of Table 2 are based on equation (1), and document the losses 
following the first divorce.  The estimates on the right hand side of the table document 
the losses following the most recent divorce. We present Huber adjusted standard error 
estimates, which take into account the possibility that siblings’ error terms are correlated. 
Beginning with the left side of Table 2, we see that including fixed effects 
substantially reduces the estimated cost of divorce.  Nevertheless, the decline in 
economic resources is still large:  in the first year following a divorce, for example, pre-
tax family income falls by about 42%, post-tax income falls by 32% and food 
consumption declines by 29%.
13   Over most of the post-divorce years, the reduction in 
food consumption is around 50 and 70% of the post-tax income reduction.
14  This is 
broadly consistent with previous studies that have estimated the elasticity of food 
consumption with respect to income to be between 0.6 and 0.7.
15  
                                                           
13 The estimated “year of divorce” effect for the income measures will provide a mixture 
of income from before and after the divorce.  For this reason, we refer to the period one 
year after the divorce as our first post-divorce observation.  For food consumption, the 
timing is slightly different.  The food consumption questions, as noted above, are likely 
to refer to the year of the survey, and so the “year of divorce” effect will capture a post-
divorce period. 
14 Because the timing differs between the consumption and income measures, this ratio is 
calculated using, for example, the effect on food consumption one year after the divorce 
relative to income two years after the divorce. 
15 See Tobin (1950), Maddala (1971), Izan (1980) and Magnus and Morgan (1997) for 
estimates of the income elasticity of food.   18 
 
 
Over the course of the next six years, more than  half of the loss in economic 
resources is recouped so that six or more years later, pre- and post-tax income are 15-
20% lower than they would have been if the divorce had not occurred and food 
consumption is six percent lower than would be expected with no divorce.  These 
estimates are notably smaller than those produced by simple before and after 
comparisons, which are typically weighted towards short-term losses.  Using the same 
dataset, McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) for example, estimate that teenagers who 
experience a parental divorce sometime between ages 12 and 17 experience an income 
decline of approximately 50%.   
On the other hand, at first glance our estimates appear to be substantially larger 
than those produced by Duncan and Hoffman.  Duncan and Hoffman emphasize the ratio 
of post-divorce to pre-divorce income and find that in the year following separation 
children’s (pre-tax) family income is 32% lower than its pre-divorce level and that five 
years later it is just four percent lower than its pre-divorce level.  Our estimated losses of 
42% (one year) and 25% (five year) are larger because our model explicitly accounts for 
income growth over the life-cycle.  Assuming that parents who divorce have similar 
income trajectories as parents who remain together, Duncan and Hoffman’s estimates 
suggest that children whose parents divorce experience a 37% decline in income in the 
year following a divorce, and that five years after the divorce takes place their income is 
14% lower than it would have been.  The small differences between these estimates and 
our own may result from our ability to control for macroeconomic conditions. 
Two potential explanations for the recovery pattern immediately come to mind.  
First, mothers’ human capital investment may increase family income over time.  Second,   19 
 
 
some mothers will remarry, thus increasing the economic resources available to their 
children through the addition of a spouse’s earnings.  About 30% of the divorced parents 
in our sample ultimately remarry during our observation window.   
We explore this possibility on the right side of Table 2, where the estimates are 
based on a specification in which the divorce dummies refer to the number of years since 
the last divorce.  For years in which the child is (because of remarriage) again in a two-
parent household, all of the divorce dummies are set equal to 0, and a dummy variable 
indicating that the child currently resides in a two-parent family is set equal to 1.  The 
coefficient estimates on the divorce dummies now indicate how much of the economic 
loss associated with divorce persists for children whose mothers do not remarry.  We find 
that subsequent marriages explain a large portion of the recovery process: pre- and post-
tax family income of children whose mothers remain unmarried six or more years after 
the marital dissolution are 40 to 45% lower than they would have been if the divorce had 
not taken place.  Among those who do not remarry, food consumption recovers more than 
income but six or more years later it continues to be 17% lower than if no divorce had 
occurred.   
Previous work has emphasized that changes in family structure are a common 
pathway into (and out of) poverty (Bane and Ellwood, 1986).  Our results can be 
interpreted in this light: we show that the average child whose parents divorce will 
experience quite modest long-run declines in economic well-being compared to estimates 
produced by the cross-sectional studies cited above, but that the size of the expected 
changes in children’s income and consumption are closely tied to subsequent changes in 
family structure.  We estimate that the average family experiences a six percent fall in   20 
 
 
food consumption and a 15% reduction in after-tax income.  An important reason for 
these relatively modest long-run reductions in income and consumption, however, is that 
many parents will remarry and thus restore some of the economic resources lost with 
divorce.  For children whose parents remain unmarried, the average losses associated 
with divorce are much larger, ranging from 17 to over 40 percent.  This emphasizes the 
important role that family structure plays in the material resources available to children. 
 
4.A.1. Robustness Checks 
One concern with the estimates presented in Table 2 is that even in the absence of 
divorce income may grow less rapidly among those who will eventually divorce than 
among those families that remain intact.  If this is true, our fixed-effects estimates will 
overstate the reduction in income due to the divorce, since our estimates of income 
growth over the life-cycle are identified off of both types of families.  In order to 
investigate this possibility, we have estimated models in which we include both a family-
specific trend and a family-specific fixed effect.  These models produce no evidence that 
divorcing families have lower earnings trajectories than intact families.  In fact, parents 
who ultimately divorce have slightly more positive earnings trends than those who 
remain together, although the difference in trends between these two groups is not 
statistically significant.  As a result, the inclusion of family-specific trends slightly 
increases the estimated cost of divorce, although the estimates are generally not 
statistically different from those reported in Table 2. 
Another potential concern is that our regression framework does not control for 
time-varying factors that might be correlated with both the probability of divorce and 
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family resources.  If the onset of mental illness or drug abuse leads to a significant 
number of divorces, for example, then our estimates may still be biased.  Charles and 
Stephens (2001) examine whether the probability of divorce is associated with job loss or 
the onset of a disability and find that job loss does increase the likelihood of a marital 
break-up.  This could mean that some of the estimated losses associated with divorce are 
actually the effect of an earlier, precipitating event.  We cannot directly investigate all 
possible events but we have tried to acknowledge their possible effects by including 
dummy variables for years prior to the divorce in order to see whether some other event 
could be generating the decline in income.  We find no evidence that family income falls 
in any year prior to the divorce.  Food consumption begins to fall in the year prior to the 
divorce, but this may simply reflect respondents’ uncertainty about the time period to 
which the PSID question refers.  We have also run regressions that include variables 
indicating whether the head of household has recently become unemployed or disabled, 
since these events are observable in the PSID, but including these controls has no 
substantive impact on our estimates.  Finally, we have run IV regressions using an 
indicator for whether the family’s state of residence currently has a unilateral divorce law 
as an instrument for divorce.  Several researchers (e.g. Friedberg, 1998; Gruber, 2000; 
Reilly and Evenhouse, 1997) have documented a correlation between unilateral divorce 
laws and divorce rates.  Unfortunately, virtually all of the within state variation in 
unilateral divorce laws occurs during the early 1970’s, which means that most of the 
children in our sample cannot contribute to this IV identification strategy.  As a result, the 
standard error estimates produced by our IV analysis are more than two orders of   22 
 
 
magnitude larger than those produced by OLS, so our IV estimates provide no 
information about the economic consequences of divorce. 
  
4.B. The Economic Losses for Children Born to Single Mothers 
Estimating the loss in economic resources for children born into single-parent 
families is trickier than estimating the losses associated with divorce because the event 
that creates the single-parent family does not provide a change in marital status to which 
the resources can be compared.  As a result, most of what we know about the relative 
resources available to such children comes from cross-sectional comparisons.  Table 1 
indicates why this might be problematic: compared to the mothers of children born into 
two-parent families, the mothers of children born out-of-wedlock have typically 
completed lower levels of education and are much more likely to be black.  Within the 
sample of children who are born into single-parent families there are also differences in 
some observable characteristics between those whose mothers eventually marry and those 
whose mothers do not.  Single mothers who do eventually marry are less likely to have 
only a high school education, and are much less likely to be black.
17    Differences in the 
observable characteristics presented in the table may only hint at important differences in 
unobservable characteristics across groups.  Our method of estimating the income losses 
associated with single parenthood allows us to control for these characteristics. 
                                                           
17 It is worth noting that while family income is higher in the year of birth for out-of-
wedlock children whose parents do not marry than for those whose parents do eventually 
marry, in subsequent years this reverses.  For example, among children who are still in 
single parent families at the age of four, average family income among those who will 
later marry is more than $14,000, but among those whose mothers are not observed to 
marry before the end of our sample average family income is about $12,000.  This pattern 
appears to be driven by a few outliers, and may reflect changes in living arrangements   23 
 
 
Using our sample of children born out-of-wedlock, we compare the income gains 
for children whose mothers eventually marry to the income gains for children whose 
mothers remain single, and interpret the negative of these estimates as the estimated 
resource loss associated with remaining in a single-parent family.  The drawback to our 
approach is that, by using women who marry to identify the costs of living in this type of 
single-parent family, we will generate a type of selection bias.  If there is heterogeneity in 
the gains to marriage and, as seems likely, those women who marry have larger gains to 
marriage than those who do not, our estimates will be upward biased estimates of the 
average income gain that would result if all out-of-wedlock mothers were to marry.  
However, the estimated effects are unbiased estimates of the gains to children whose 
parents actually do marry.  As noted above, roughly half of the parents of children born 
out-of-wedlock will marry before the child is 15 years old. 
The results of our exercise are presented in Table 3.  One year after marriage pre-
tax family income increases by 53%, and post-tax income increases by 48%.  The effects 
of excluding federal taxes from income are smaller in this sample than for our sample of 
children born into two-parent households, which probably reflects the very low income 
levels of many families formed by an out-of-wedlock birth.  Six or more years after the 
observed marriage, post-tax income is 28 percent higher than it would be if the children 
had remained in single-parent families.   
Food consumption is estimated to increase by 17% in the year of the marriage, but 
immediately falls again.  The effects of marriage on food consumption are very small, 
sometimes negative, and never statistically significant in the years following the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
over time.  For example, a teenage mother may live with her parents during the year her 
baby is born but may subsequently move out.   24 
 
 
marriage.  This indicates a much lower elasticity of food consumption with respect to 
income than we found in our sample of children born into two-parent families, which 
probably results from the mothers’ relatively lower incomes.  Food consumption is likely 
to be maintained at some minimal level even when income is at the very low levels found 
in many of these single-parent households.   
On the right side of Table 3 we show what happens to our estimates when we 
control for the possibility of initial marriages breaking up (and for subsequent marriages).  
In these regressions, the key variables indicate time elapsed in a two-parent household; 
the dummy variables are set to zero during years in which the household returns to 
single-parent status, and an additional dummy variable is added to these regressions 
indicating that a parent is currently between marriages.  These results show that declining 
economic gains shown on the left side of the table are driven mainly by the fact that 
many marriages do not last: for those children whose parents remain married there is a 
fairly stable increase in post-tax income of between 50 and 58%.   This suggests that 
virtually all of the reduction in the gains to marriage occurs as a result of the original 
marriages breaking up.   
These large income estimates suggest that children born into single-parent 
families suffer substantive economic losses as a direct result of their parents’ marital 
status, and that cross-sectional differences between the resources available to these 
children and those available to children in two-parent families do not merely reflect 
differences in their parents’ unobservable characteristics. At the same time, however, we 
find that cross-sectional comparisons will substantially overstate the potential gains from 
marriage.  If we run a simple OLS regression controlling for age, age-squared, family   25 
 
 
size, mother’s education, whether the child is black and calendar year, the estimated 
increase in income associated with marriage is much larger, at 118%, compared to our 
estimated gain of 57 to 59%.  Further, the gain to a typical child whose mother marries at 
a point in time is even smaller, since many of these marriages will be short-lived.    
As with our sample of children born into two-parent families, we have also 
attempted to estimate models that allow for family-specific trends using our sample of 
children born to single parents.  Unfortunately, these models are not well-identified 
because for many of the families in the sample, there are relatively few observations 
available prior to the marriage.  Our results provide some suggestive evidence that those 
mothers who do eventually marry have higher rates of income growth in the years prior 
to marriage than those who do not.  Although the differential in the income growth rates 
is not statistically significant, the point estimate is fairly large, suggesting an annual 
income growth rate that is five percent higher among women who do eventually marry.  
Including family-specific trends reduces the estimated gains to marriage, but also makes 
the estimates extremely imprecise, so that we cannot statistically distinguish most 
coefficients between the two models (those with and without family-specific trends). 
 
5. How do Families Adjust to Changes in Family Structure? 
Our estimates indicate that the economic losses experienced by children living in 
single-parent families are substantial.
18  These losses might be bigger still, however, if 
families failed to adjust their behavior in response to changes in family structure.    
                                                           
18 Of course, our estimates tell us nothing about the distribution of resources within 
families.  It may be that when resources decline parents reallocate in order to maintain 
their children’s previous consumption levels.  This is an important issue that deserves   26 
 
 
Consider the effects of divorce in the absence of any changes in labor supply, household 
structure (other than departure of one parent), or welfare receipt: assuming that children 
remain with their mothers, the mechanical effect would simply be the loss of the father’s 
income.  But resource losses could be much lower if family members draw on other 
income sources.  In order to better understand how different potential behavioral 
responses combine to affect our estimated resource losses, we next look at individual 
components of income around the time of the change in family structure.  
 
5.A. Behavioral Responses to Divorce 
We begin our analysis of income components by estimating the average loss in 
father’s earnings, which illustrates (approximately) what would happen to family income 
if there were no behavioral responses.
19  Here, we essentially re-estimate equation (2), but 
replace our dependent variables with father’s earnings and look specifically at the first 
two years following divorce.  Note that for this exercise we use income measured in 
levels rather than in logs, which leads to a larger estimated percentage income decline, 
but allows us to include cases in which the individual income components are equal to 
zero.  The levels specification is not our preferred specification for the main analysis 
because a change in family structure is likely to have very different level effects on rich 
and poor families.  The table defines time since the divorce relative to the most recent 
divorce, so that all observations in the “after” period are for children whose parents 
remain unmarried.   The results produced by this exercise are shown in the first row of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
further investigation but we know of no data on the distribution of family resources that 
follows families over time.  
19 More precisely, we use father’s income within the child’s household.  In the years after 
a divorce in which the father has left the household, father’s income is equal to zero.   27 
 
 
Table 4.  In subsequent rows of the table we add child support, mother’s earnings, 
welfare income, and the earnings of other household members to the income definition.  
In the period 1 to 2 years after divorce, father’s income falls to zero, which 
translates into an average loss of approximately $32,000.  This corresponds to an 83% 
loss in family income relative to the year before the divorce takes place.
20  Of course, it is 
not necessarily the case that father’s income will disappear completely from the child’s 
set of available resources since many fathers pay child support when they no longer 
reside in the household.  The second row of Table 4 shows how divorce affects the sum 
of father’s income and child support.  Child support appears to replace a relatively small 
fraction of the income of the co-resident father.  The loss of income from the father in the 
initial years after a divorce is approximately 12 percent lower when child support is 
included, or roughly $28,000.  The magnitude of this estimate is roughly consistent with 
average child support received, as reported by the Census Bureau, of approximately 
$3700 in 1995 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1999). 
One potentially important behavioral response following divorce is a change in 
mothers’ labor supply.  The next row of Table 4 adds mother’s earnings to the measure of 
income used in row 2, and shows that this response plays an important role in replacing 
the loss in resources following the father’s departure.   Adding mother’s earnings to the 
income definition reduces the initial loss to approximately $25,000 in the initial years 
after the divorce, which translates into a 63% loss in total family income.  Of course this 
gain in income may come at the expense of spending time with her children and does not 
take additional child care expenses into account. 
                                                           
20 Results for subsequent years are very similar and are available from the authors upon 
request.   28 
 
 
Along with increases in earned income, any take-up of public assistance for single 
mothers will further diminish the costs of divorce. Row 4 of Table 4 shows, however, that 
the extent to which transfer income mitigates the loss in fathers’ income is small 
compared to the effect of child support and mother’s earnings.  When we add AFDC 
benefits to the income definition in the initial years after divorce the total income loss is 
further diminished by  $700.  
At first glance, the estimated effect on total family income of adding income from 
other family members is puzzling (Row 5).  One might expect that other family members, 
such as grandparents or aunts and uncles, would increase their contributions to the family 
following a relative’s divorce.  In fact, our estimate implies that the opposite is occurring.  
The result is driven by a few families who receive extremely high levels of income from 
other family members before the divorce occurs, and disappears when the top 1% of the 
distribution of other income (before the divorce) is removed from the sample. 
 
5.B. Behavioral Responses to Marriage 
In the last column of Table 4, we repeat the income decomposition for our sample 
of out-of-wedlock children whose mothers marry.  The first row shows the increase in 
income that would occur if the only change resulting from marriage was the addition of a 
male partner.  Father’s earnings increase family income by approximately $17,000 in the 
first two years after marriage, which would more than double total family income if all 
other income sources remained the same.
21  The second row in the table considers 
whether the gains to marriage are reduced when we account for the fact that child support 
                                                           
21 We refer to “father’s income” although this may actually be step-father’s income, or 
the income of a male cohabitor  who is unrelated to the child.    29 
 
 
may have been received prior to marriage, and shows that for children born to single-
parents child support plays a very limited role: adding child support to the income 
definition reduces the gains to marriage by less than $400.   
We next examine the extent to which an adjustment in mother’s labor supply may 
alter the gains associated with marriage.  As was the case with children born to two 
parent households, the mother’s labor supply response has the largest impact on the 
estimated resource cost.  The cost of single-parent status is estimated to be $4000 or 25% 
lower than it would be if mothers did not increase their labor supply as a result of being 
without a live-in partner. 
  Unsurprisingly, AFDC plays a somewhat larger role maintaining income among 
out-of-wedlock children than among children who experience divorce.  Including AFDC 
in the income definition reduces the estimated gains to marriage by roughly $1000 (or 
6%).
22  Finally, the contribution of other family members also appears to be reduced 
when marriages occur.  Including earnings of other family members reduces the gains to 
marriage by about $1000. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
  Family structure has a significant impact on the economic resources that are 
available to children.  In the long run, family income of children whose parents divorce 
and remain divorced for at least six years falls by 40 to 45% and food consumption is 
reduced by 17%.  Among the less-studied population of children born to single parents 
there is no evidence of an increase in food consumption, but those whose parents marry 
and remain married for at least six years experience post-tax income gains of 50% and   30 
 
 
pre-tax gains of 57%.  The more modest effects of living with a single parent on food 
consumption suggest that children’s access to essentials may be somewhat better 
protected than estimates focused on income indicate.     
  While our estimated effects of family structure on income are large, three 
important points should be kept in mind.  First, because the estimates are based on 
variation within the same families over time they are substantially smaller than estimates 
based on cross-sectional comparisons of different types of families.  The frequency with 
which cross-sectional income comparisons motivate concern about family structure 
makes it important to recognize the extent to which they may overstate the true losses 
associated with living in a single-parent family.  
  Second, the estimated income changes, (as in most of the previous literature) do 
not apply to the typical child who experiences a parental divorce at a point in time, but 
rather to those whose parents are currently divorced.  When we measure the reduction in 
resources six years after the first observed divorce, and so allow for the possibility of 
remarriage, we find income losses of 15 to 20%, and consumption losses of just  six 
percent. Similarly, the typical gains for a child born out-of-wedlock whose parent is 
currently married are smaller than the long-run effects cited above, since many marriages 
do not last.   
  Finally, it is important to note that while we estimate that single-parent families 
have substantially lower incomes than they would have if a second parent were in the 
household, these income losses do not necessarily translate into a decline in children’s 
resources.  Our model cannot inform us about the distribution of resources within 
families, and it may be that parents work hard to ensure that their children’s needs are 
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met by disproportionately reducing their own resources when income falls.  This is an 
important issue that deserves further investigation.  Unfortunately, we do not know of 
any panel datasets that contain information on how resources are distributed within the 
household. 
  With this caveat, our findings suggest that family structure has a long-term impact 
on the economic resources that are available to children.  The costs associated with 
growing up in single-parent families are not temporary but largely persist until a marriage 
or re-marriage occurs.  This has important implications for public policy.  Time limits 
recently imposed as part of welfare reform, for example, could result in substantive 
reductions in the economic well-being of children living in single-parent families.  
Furthermore, if income plays an important role in determining children’s later success in 
life (which is matter of some debate), then our results suggest that policies that encourage 
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Remain in Two Parents Remain  Parent Eventually
Parent Family Divorce in Single Marries
Parent Family
Pre-tax Family Income 40,964 33,852 17,907 17,218
(25243) (24977) (19081) (15165)
Post-tax Family Income 30,778 24,864 16,162 16,718
(17347) (13460) (15435) (14324)
Food Consumption 5877 5284 4430 4285
(2778) (2380) (2795) (2920)
Mother's ed <= High  0.551 0.624 0.78 0.72
   School (0.50) (0.49) (0.41) (0.45)
Black 0.081 0.11 0.63 0.35
(0.27) (0.31) (0.48) (0.48)
Maximum AFDC Benefit 7808 7805 6657 7344
  for Family of Four (2990) (3133) (3004) (3102)
Family Size 4.14 3.92 4.42 3.74
(1.32) (1.10) (2.02) (1.90)
Number of Children in 6228 1235 1606 483
   Sample
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis
Table 1. Sample Means in Year of Birth
Born into Two Parent Family Born into Single Parent FamilyYears Before  Log Log Log Log Log Log
or After Divorce Income After-tax Income Consumption Income After-tax Income Consumption
2 years before -0.011 -0.008 0.010 0.000 0.018 0.013
(0.059) (0.056) (0.045) (0.058) (0.055) (0.045)
  -0.011 -0.008 0.010 0.000 0.018 0.013
1 year before -0.052 -0.028 -0.134 -0.045 -0.022 -0.132
(0.052) (0.049) (0.061) (0.050) (0.048) (0.061)
-0.051 -0.028 -0.125 -0.044 -0.022 -0.124
Year of Divorce -0.356 -0.241 -0.348 -0.360 -0.246 -0.346
  (0.070) (0.065) (0.066) (0.068) (0.065) (0.067)
-0.300 -0.214 -0.294 -0.302 -0.218 -0.292
1 year after -0.541 -0.389 -0.203 -0.692 -0.514 -0.252
(0.072) (0.066) (0.055) (0.072) (0.070) (0.052)
-0.418 -0.322 -0.184 -0.499 -0.402 -0.223
2 years after -0.386 -0.260 -0.156 -0.595 -0.431 -0.241
(0.072) (0.071) (0.056) (0.074) (0.080) (0.064)
-0.320 -0.229 -0.144 -0.448 -0.350 -0.214
3 years after -0.302 -0.195 -0.169 -0.622 -0.455 -0.266
(0.080) (0.074) (0.069) (0.072) (0.085) (0.090)
-0.261 -0.177 -0.155 -0.463 -0.366 -0.234
4 year after -0.205 -0.108 -0.138 -0.547 -0.374 -0.221
(0.081) (0.071) (0.055) (0.064) (0.078) (0.066)
-0.185 -0.102 -0.129 -0.421 -0.312 -0.198
5 year after -0.282 -0.194 -0.102 -0.674 -0.505 -0.211
(0.098) (0.081) (0.054) (0.079) (0.085) (0.062)
-0.246 -0.176 -0.097 -0.490 -0.396 -0.190
6 or more years -0.220 -0.165 -0.060 -0.599 -0.517 -0.180
after (0.085) (0.082) (0.046) (0.082) (0.082) (0.059)
-0.197 -0.152 -0.058 -0.451 -0.404 -0.165
Number of
Observations 48111 48111 46523 48111 48111 46523
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Percentage effect in italics.
Table 2.  Estimated Economic Consequences Associated with Single Parent Family Status 
Year Since First Divorce Year Since Last Divorce
Children Born into Two Parent FamiliesYears Before  Log Log Log Log Log Log
or After Marriage Income After-tax Income Consumption Income After-tax Income Consumption
2 years before 0.084 0.081 -0.161 0.099 0.094 -0.164
(0.104) (0.103) (0.124) (0.103) (0.101) (0.124)
0.088 0.084 -0.149 0.104 0.099 -0.151
1 year before -0.102 0.107 -0.049 -0.082 -0.088 -0.051
(0.175) (0.174) (0.071) (0.173) (0.172) (0.070)
-0.097 0.113 -0.047 -0.079 -0.084 -0.049
   
Year of Marriage 0.506 0.471 0.157 0.527 0.490 0.146
  (0.130) (0.126) (0.066) (0.128) (0.124) (0.067)
0.658 0.602 0.170 0.693 0.633 0.157
1 year after 0.426 0.389 -0.033 0.465 0.426 -0.012
(0.131) (0.127) (0.082) (0.126) (0.122) (0.083)
0.531 0.476 -0.032 0.592 0.531 -0.012
2 years after 0.327 0.300 -0.075 0.471 0.432 0.003
(0.131) (0.127) (0.088) (0.118) (0.115) (0.093)
0.387 0.349 -0.073 0.602 0.541 0.003
 
3 years after 0.319 0.291 -0.073 0.502 0.459 -0.068
(0.135) (0.130) (0.097) (0.126) (0.122) (0.088)
0.375 0.338 -0.071 0.653 0.583 -0.066
4 year after 0.251 0.225 0.003 0.508 0.463 0.003
(0.139) (0.135) (0.084) (0.125) (0.121) (0.086)
0.286 0.252 0.003 0.663 0.589 0.003
 
5 year after 0.239 0.210 -0.022 0.471 0.429 0.002
(0.141) (0.138) (0.090) (0.135) (0.130) (0.089)
0.270 0.234 -0.022 0.602 0.536 0.002
6 or more years 0.286 0.250 -0.010 0.453 0.402 0.020
after (0.170) (0.166) (0.096) (0.187) (0.184) (0.098)
0.331 0.284 -0.010 0.573 0.495 0.020
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Percentage effect in italics.
Table 3.  Estimated Economic Consequences Associated with Single Parent Family Status 
Children Born into Single Parent Families
Year Since First Marriage Year Since Last Marriage 1 year before 1-2 years 1 year before 1-2 years
  divorce after divorce marriage after marriage
Dependent variable    
(1) father's earnings -$32,231 $17,211
(5018) (1534)
(2) (1) + child support received -$28,237 $16,892
(4133) (1554)
(3) (2) + mother's earnings -$24,563 $12,758
(4025) (2309)
(4) (3) + afdc of head & wife -$23,841 $11,777
(4042) (2008)
(5) (4) + earnings of others -$26,737 $10,798
(4396) (2224)
(6) total family income -$26,760 $10,534
(4220) (2517)
Average family income  $38,708 $16,223
Table 4. Components of Income Change Associated with 
Changes in Family Structure